Elections are thought to improve voter welfare through two channels: effective accountability (i.e., providing incentives for politicians to take costly effort) and electoral selection (i.e., retaining politicians with characteristics voters value). We show that there may be a trade-off between these two channels. Higher levels of effective accountability may hinder the voters' ability to learn about the politicians. In turn, this may hinder electoral selection and be detrimental to voter welfare. This is because increasing effective accountability directly impacts how informative governance outcomes are about an incumbent's type. We show that, if politicians' effort and type are local substitutes (resp. complements) in the production of governance outcomes, an increase in effective accountability corresponds to a decrease (resp. increase) in Blackwell (1951) informativeness. We also show that effective accountability can vary even absent institutional variation. In particular, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be multiple equilibria that differ in terms of both effective accountability and electoral selection. Overall, our findings have implications for voter behavior, the efficacy of institutional reforms, and voter welfare. * We have benefited from conversations with
Electoral accountability is an important feature of democratic societies. The hope is that giving citizens formal accountability-i.e., the formal right to retain or replace policy makers-will lead to policy outcomes that are better for citizen welfare.
Formal accountability is thought to be linked to welfare improvements for two reasons. (See Fearon, 1999.) First, when voters have the formal right to retain or replace policy makers, the politicians' actions are shaped by how they anticipate the voters will respond. That is, formal accountability creates what we will call effective accountability. Second, voters have the ability to retain politicians whose characteristics are best aligned with their own interests. That is, formal accountability creates electoral selection.
An important precursor for electoral selection is the voters' ability to learn about the politicians' characteristics. This paper focuses on how changes in the level of effective accountability impact the voters' ability to do so-i.e., on the informational consequences of changing the level of effective accountability. It shows that such informational effects can have counter-intuitive implications for both voter behavior and voter welfare.
To illustrate the informational effect, consider an incumbent politician implementing a new policy. High quality politicians have better ideas and low quality politicians have worse ideas.
The ultimate policy outcome depends on both the politicians' idea and the effort she puts into implementing the policy. Voters observe neither her quality nor her effort. While the incumbent knows how much effort she puts in, she does not know her own quality-that is, she does not know how good her idea is. Both the incumbent and voter observe the the governance outcome, i.e., the results of the final policy. Thus, the governance outcome serves as a signal of the incumbent's quality. Importantly, this signal depends on the effort she put into implementing the policy.
Notice, in the above, it is governance outcomes and not actions that serve as a signal of the incumbent's characteristics. This is an important point: The trade-off we focus on does not arise because the incumbent has an incentive to signal her type by choosing a costly action. That is, it does not arise because there is correlation between the incumbent's action and her type. In particular, we focus on an informational effect that arises within a signal-jamming model in the spirit of Holmström's (1999) career concerns model. (A long tradition in political economy uses such models to study the agency relationship between a voter and a politician. See, e.g., Lohmann, 1998; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Tabellini, 2007, 2008.) In these models, politicians do not know their types and so all types must choose the same action. Thus, there is no correlation between action and type.
Nonetheless, the voters' ability to learn about the characteristics of politicians will quite generally depend on the level of effective accountability. From the voters' perspective, the governance outcome (which, again, depends on the incumbent's characteristics and actions) is the realization of a statistical experiment that generates information about the incumbent. Different levels of effective accountability generate different statistical experiments. Hence, how informative governance outcomes are about the incumbent depends on the level of effective accountability. In particular, we show that, when the politicians' actions and characteristics are local substitutes (resp. complements) in the production of governance outcomes, an increase in effective accountability corresponds to a decrease (resp. increase) in Blackwell (1951) informativeness. We next preview the implications for voter behavior and voter welfare.
Voter Behavior An increase in effective accountability induces an improvement in the distribution of governance outcomes. As a result, when effective accountability is higher, the voter requires higher levels of public goods to infer neutral news about the incumbent's characteristics. It is then natural to conjecture that, when effective accountability is higher, the voter will hold the incumbent to a more stringent performance standard. But this need not be the case. There is a potentially countervailing effect that arises from the fact that changes in effective accountability alter the informativeness of governance outcomes. Whether this informational effect offsets the direct effect of increasing effective accountability depends on (i) whether actions and characteristics are local complements or substitutes and (ii) the probability that incumbents and challengers are high ability. (We later explain why.) We show that an increase in effective accountability may correspond to a less stringent performance standard.
This fact has important implications for the empirical literature on accountability. In particular, there is an influential body of scholarship that makes inferences about the level of effective accountability by observing facts about voter behavior. (See, e.g., Fiorina (1981) ; Bartels (2004, 2006) ; Healy, Malhotra and Mo (2010) .) The ability to make such inferences rests on the natural conjecture that the voter adopts a performance standard that is monotone in the level of effective accountability (i.e., that the voter holds the incumbent to a more stringent performance standard if there is a higher level of effective accountability). Our results show that the relationship is more subtle; this, in turn, has implications for this empirical literature's attempts to identify the level of effective accountability.
Voter Welfare We show that there may be a trade-off between effective accountability and electoral selection. Higher levels of effective accountability may reduce the voters' ability to learn about the characteristics of politicians, thereby hindering electoral selection. When this is the case, there are non-trivial consequences for voter welfare. Specifically, if higher levels of effective accountability correspond to lower levels of informativeness, they can also be associated with lower levels of voter welfare.
Our results show that there is a trade-off between electoral selection and effective accountability if and only if the politician's effort and characteristics are local substitutes (in the production of governance outcomes). So, in the case of complements, higher levels of effective accountability unambiguously improve voter welfare. But, in the case of substitutes, the voter may be worse off with a higher level of effective accountability and a lower level of electoral selection.
This raises the question of how to improve voter welfare. The standard approach is to think of variation in effective accountability as a result of variation in the institutions of formal accountability. That is, varying term length, compensation, campaign finance rules, staff resources, etc., may lead to variation in effective accountability. (See, e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Maskin and Tirole, 2004; Besley, 2006; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2006; Gehlbach, 2007; Myerson, 2006 for theoretical studies and Case, 1995, 2003; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Huber and Gordon, 2004; Besley, 2004; Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose, 2011; de Janvry, Finan and Sadoulet, 2012; Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013; Finan and Ferraz, 2011 for empirical studies.)
Our formal model captures institutional variation only in reduced form-in particular, by varying politicians' benefits of holding office and costs from actions.
But, importantly, we also show that varying institutions is not a prerequisite for varying the level of effective accountability (and electoral selection). Within a fixed set of institutions, there can be variation in the behavior of politicians and voters if there are multiple equilibria that differ in terms of both their level of effective accountability and in electoral selection. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for this to be the case. We go on to show that any production environment is consistent with such multiplicity: For any production environment, there are preferences of the incumbent that give rise to multiple equilibria that differ in their level of effective accountability.
In our model, equilibrium multiplicity is tied to the voter's desire to select good types. The incumbent's early behavior influences the voter's ability to infer information about the incumbent's characteristics; it is this fact that generates the possibility for multiplicity. (This fact is reminiscent of the multiplicity result in Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) . We discuss the relationship between our result and theirs in Section 5.) This raises the possibility that different societieswith identical institutions-might differ in both their level of effective accountability and electoral selection. We discuss these implications further in Section 6.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents a canonical model of electoral accountability.
Section 2 describes the basic properties of equilibrium. Section 3 characterizes when there is and is not a trade-off between effective accountability and electoral selection and shows that higher levels of effective accountability do not necessarily correspond to higher voter welfare. Section 4 describes implications for voter behavior. Section 5 shows that variation in electoral behavior need not derive from institutional variation by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria that differ in their level of effective accountability and electoral selection. Section 6 discusses the normative implications of our results.
The Model
There is an Incumbent (I), a Challenger (C), and a Voter (V ). We refer to each Politician (P ) as "she" and the Voter as "he." In each of two periods, the Voter receives a level of public goods.
This level is a function of the effort taken by the Politician in office, the type of the Politician in office, and an idiosyncratic shock.
The Politician in office chooses a level of effort in A ⊆ R + . The set A is closed, with a its smallest element. The set of types is Θ = {θ, θ}, where θ is the low type and θ > θ is the high type. 1 Write π P ∈ (0, 1) for the probability that Politician P is type θ. These probabilities are commonly understood by the players.
The level of public goods produced in a period is a function of a production technology and a random shock. The production function f : A × Θ → R + is strictly increasing in effort (a) and type (θ). We will be interested in complementarity and substitutability between effort and type.
Definition 1.1. Fix actions a * * > a * .
(i) Effort and type are complements at a * , a * * if f (a * * , θ) − f (a * * , θ) ≥ f (a * , θ) − f (a * , θ).
(ii) Effort and type are substitutes at a * , a * * if f (a * , θ) − f (a * , θ) ≥ f (a * * , θ) − f (a * * , θ).
These definitions of complementarity vs. substitutability are local; effort and type may be complements at two levels of effort, but substitutes at other levels of effort. If effort and type are complements (resp. substitutes) at a * , a * * but not substitutes (resp. complements) at a * , a * * , we say that effort and type are strict complements (resp. strict substitutes) at a * , a * * .
If, in period t, the Politician in office chooses effort level a, is of type θ, and the random shock is t , the level of public goods produced in that period is f (a, θ) + t . Each t is the realization of a random variable. These random variables are independent of each other and are independent of the Politicians' abilities. In particular, each of these random variables is distributed according to an absolutely continuous CDF, Φ, with a continuously differentiable PDF, φ. This distribution satisfies two additional requirements: First, for each x > x ≥ 0, the associated likelihood ratio defined by
is onto with non-zero derivatives. Second, the distribution satisfies the (strict) monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) relative to all possible realizations of production: If x > x ≥ 0, then the associated likelihood ratio
is strictly increasing in g. 2 At times, we will be interested in specific examples of this framework.
is symmetric, the MLRP implies that φ is single-peaked about zero, i.e., φ is strictly increasing on (−∞, 0) and strictly decreasing on (0, ∞). (See Torgersen, 1991, Theorem 9.4.9 ). Call the model symmetric if the density is symmetric and π I = π C .
Prior to the game being played, Nature determines the realizations of each Politician's type and of the random shocks (in all periods). These realizations are not observed by any of the players. The Voter's payoffs are the sum of public goods produced in the two periods. Each Politicians' payoffs depend on both a benefit from holding office and the level of effort chosen while in office.
The benefit from holding office is given by B > 0. The cost of taking effort a is given by a cost function c(·), where c(·) is strictly increasing and B > c(a) ≥ 0. A Politician's payoff in governance period t is 0 if she is not in office and B − c(a t ) if she is in office and chooses effort a t . A Politician's payoffs are given by the sum of her payoffs in each governance period.
We will be interested in understanding how changing the Politicians' benefits of reelection and cost function affects the Voter's ability to acquire information and the Voter's welfare. With this in mind, it will be convenient to think of the model as parameterized by B and c. Write M(B, c)
for the model in which the benefits of reelection and cost functions take on the values B and c.
Comments on the Model Let us comment on how the features of the model relate to the concepts of interest.
First, in our model, the level of effective accountability corresponds to the level of effort exerted by a politician. Institutions of formal accountability correspond to institutional features that affect the Incumbent's electoral incentives to exert effort. In practice, these can correspond to changes in the value of holding office-e.g., compensation, term limits, opportunities for promotion, or (external) opportunities in the lobbying industry (Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013) . They can also correspond to changes in the costliness of effort-e.g., the level of funding for corruption investigations might impact the trade-off between public corruption and public goods provision (Finan and Ferraz, 2011) . We abstract away from any specific institutional features. Instead, we take a reduced-form approach, modeling changes in the institutions of formal accountability through variation in B and c. 
Properties of Equilibrium
In this section, we fix a model M(B, c) and point to basic properties of equilibrium, which will be useful in our subsequent analysis. We focus on pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
The Voter's Reelection Decision In the second governance period, there are no electoral benefits from taking costly effort. As such, the politician in office will choose the lowest possible effort, i.e., a 2 = a, independent of the history. So, the Voter's electoral decision depends only on his expectation about the Politicians' types. As a consequence, the Voter adopts a cutoff rule in the space of posterior beliefs. If the Voter expects the Incumbent's first-period choice wasã and he observed a level of public goods g 1 , his posterior belief that the Incumbent is of high type is
Pr I (θ|g 1 ,ã). The Voter reelects the Incumbent if and only if his posterior
is higher than the threshold π C .
The fact that the Voter adopts a cutoff rule in the space of posterior probabilities implies that the Voter also adopts a cutoff rule in the space of public goods. To see this, define the likelihood ratio as a function of public goods and efforts, i.e., LR :
Observe that Pr I (θ|g 1 ,ã) ≥ π C holds if and only if
(1)
Since LR (·,ã) is onto, there exists someĝ(ã) satisfying
By the MLRP, the left-hand side of Equation (1) is strictly increasing in g 1 . So, if the Voter believes the Incumbent's first-period effort isã and the first-period outcome is g 1 , the Voter reelects the Incumbent if g 1 >ĝ(ã) and replaces her if g 1 <ĝ(ã).
Example 2.1. Suppose the model is symmetric. Since π I = π C , Equation (2) says thatĝ(a) solves φ(ĝ(a) − f (a, θ)) = φ(ĝ(a) − f (a, θ)). Since (a) the PDF φ is symmetric and single-peaked and (b)
Example 2.2. Let φ be the PDF of the standard normal distribution. Then,
It follows thatĝ
Observe that the Voter always uses the same cutpoint in the space of posterior beliefs, namely π C . However, his cutpoint in the space of public goods depends on his belief about the Incumbent's effort. In Example 2.1, this cutpoint is increasing in effort. One natural conjecture is that this is always the case: If the Voter expects the Incumbent to choose a higher effort, she holds the Incumbent to a higher benchmark for public good provision, since a larger portion of any success is credited to effort rather than competence. Section 4 will show that this conjecture is incorrect.
(That analysis will be based on Example 2.2.)
The Incumbent's First-Period Choice Suppose the Incumbent chooses the action a and the Voter expects the Incumbent to choose action a * . The Incumbent is reelected (resp. replaced) if the level of public goods observed, f (a, θ I ) + 1 , exceeds (resp. falls short of) the Voter's threshold g(a * ). The probability that the Incumbent is reelected if she chooses a when the Voter expects a * , Pr(a|a * ), is then the probability that 1 ≥ĝ(a * ) − f (a, θ I ), 3 i.e., Pr(a|a * ) = π I 1 − Φ ĝ (a * ) − f a, θ
Now consider two levels of effort a, a ∈ A. If the Voter expects the Incumbent to choose effort level a * , then the incremental increase in probability of reelection from choosing a instead of a is IR (a , a|a * ) = Pr(a |a * ) − Pr(a|a * ). 4 We can construct an equilibrium where the Incumbent chooses the effort a * in the first period if and only if, for each effort a ∈ A, IR (a * , a|a * )(B −c(a)) ≥ c(a * )−c(a), i.e., if and only if, for each a ∈ A, the Incumbent's incremental benefit from choosing a * over a (when the Voter expects a * ) is higher than her incremental cost of choosing a * over a.
Set of Equilibria Fix a model associated with the benefit of reelection and cost function (B, c) .
In light of the analysis above, we will identify a pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with intuition is familiar from the career concerns literature (Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole, 1999) . In Section 5, we return to the question of when such multiplicity does vs. does not obtain, and provide results that go beyond this familiar intuition.
Welfare and Information
One natural hypothesis is that, all else equal, a higher level of effective accountability is necessarily beneficial to the Voter. In this section, we show that this conjecture is incorrect in general, and provide sufficient conditions under which the conjecture is in fact correct.
Consider a model in which there is an equilibrium where the Incumbent plays the first-period effort level a * . Expected Voter welfare is the sum of expected first-period Voter welfare and ex ante expected second-period Voter welfare. Expected first-period Voter welfare is
Ex ante expected second-period Voter welfare is
where Pr(θ P 2 = θ|a * ) is the equilibrium probability that the Politician in office in the second period is type θ. 5 Note that Pr(θ P 2 = θ|a * ) depends on the first-period equilibrium effort and the Voter's equilibrium cutoff rule.
Clearly, higher effective accountability is good for first period welfare. Hence, it can only harm overall welfare if it decreases second period welfare. In turn, higher effective accountability can only decrease second period welfare if it decreases the probability of selecting a high type in the second period, i.e., Pr(θ P 2 = θ|a * ).
Notice, governance outcomes serve as a signal of the Incumbent's type. The signal depends on the level of effective accountability. Thus, changing the level of effective accountability serves to change the distribution from which the signal is drawn. This, in turn, changes the informativeness of the signal and, so, the Voter's ability to select high types. With this in mind, we begin with a notion of informativeness:
Definition 3.1 (Lehmann, 1988) . Say a * * is more informationally effective than a * if θ > θ , Φ(g * * − f (a * * , θ)) = Φ(g * − f (a * , θ)), and Φ(g * * − f (a * * , θ )) = Φ(g * − f (a * , θ )) imply g * * ≥ g * * .
Because Θ contains two types, a * * is more informative than a * in the sense of Blackwell (1951) if and only if a * * is more informationally effective than a * . (See Blackwell and Girshick, 1979 or Jewitt, 2007.) Fix a type θ and observe that each effort level a induces a CDF of governance outcomes, i.e., Φ(g − f (a, θ)). 6 Figure 3 .1 depicts the CDF's associated with effort levels a * * > a * . Notice, Φ(g−f (a * * , θ)) < Φ(g−f (a * , θ)). So, for any given g * , there exists g * * > g * with Φ(g * * −f (a * * , θ)) = Φ(g * − f (a * , θ)). Refer to g * * − g * as the "gap for θ at g * ." If a * * is more informationally effective than a * , the gap for θ at g * must be increasing in θ. Intuitively, this can only happen if the difference in productivity between the high and low actions, i.e., f (θ, a * * ) − f (θ, a * ), is increasing
gap for θ at g * Figure 3 .1: Gap for θ at g * .
in θ. This allows us to draw a tight connection between informational effectiveness and local complements/local substitutes. 7
Theorem 3.1. Fix a * * > a * .
(i) If effort and type are complements at (a * , a * * ), then a * * is more informationally effective than a * .
(ii) If effort and type are substitutes at (a * , a * * ), then a * is more informationally effective than a * * .
Informational effectiveness has an immediate implication for second-period welfare. (See Proposition 4 in Jewitt, 2007 .) Thus, Theorem 3.1 gives the following corollary:
Corollary 3.1. Fix a * * > a * , where a * and a * * are each justifiable.
(i) If effort and type are complements at (a * , a * * ), then VW 2 (a * * ) ≥ VW 2 (a * ).
(ii) If effort and type are substitutes at (a * , a * * ), then VW 2 (a * ) ≥ VW 2 (a * * ).
If effort and type are complements at (a * , a * * ), then increasing the level of effective accountability from a * to a * * increases both first-and second-period welfare. If effort and type are substitutes at (a * , a * * ), then increasing the level of effective accountability from a * to a * * increases first-period welfare but decreases second-period welfare.
In light of Corollary 3.1, we can provide a sufficient condition for total Voter welfare to be increasing in effective accountability.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose the model is symmetric. If a * * > a * and a * and a * * are each justifiable, then there exists π[a * , a * * ], π[a * , a * * ] ∈ (0, 1) so that the following are equivalent:
(i) π I ∈ (0, π[a * , a * * ]) ∪ (π[a * , a * * ], 1).
Proposition 3.1 focuses on the symmetric model, where the pool of Incumbents and Challengers coincide. If the prior is close to 0 or 1, the Voter has relatively little to gain from improved selection.
In that case, most Politicians are of the same type, so the likelihood that the Politician in office in the second period will be a high type is not very responsive to the first-period outcome. Hence, the first-period welfare effect of high effort dominates any negative second-period welfare effect of high effort.
It is important to note that, if effort and type are local substitutes, we may have π[a * , a * * ] > π[a * , a * * ]. In that case higher levels of effective accountability may decrease overall Voter welfare.
The following example shows that this can occur.
The production function f is described by the following Take Φ to be the CDF of the standard Normal distribution and let π I = π C = .6.
Using Example 2.1, the incremental returns in reelection probabilities satisfy the following:
IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) ∈ (.498, .499) IR (a * * , a|a * * ) ∈ (.534, .535) IR (a * , a * * |a * ) ∈ (−.422, −.421) IR (a * , a|a * ) ∈ (.268, .269) and VW 1 (a * * ) + VW 2 (a * * ) = .4(38) + .6(39) + 36[.6 + .6(.4)(2Φ(.5) − 1)] < 63.51.
Example 3.1 illustrates that higher levels of effective accountability may be associated with lower second-period Voter welfare, so much so that it may also be associated with lower levels of total Voter welfare. The key is that the Voter's expected second-period welfare depends on the probability that the Politician in office in the second-period is of high type. This, in turn, depends the Voter's ability to learn about the Incumbent's type, given the (equilibrium) level of first-period effort. Higher levels of effective accountability may hinder the Voter's ability to learn about the Incumbent's type.
The Reelection Decision and Information
There is a natural conjecture concerning the relationship between the Voter's reelection standard and the level of effective accountability. Intuitively, when there is a higher level of effective accountability, the Voter expects a higher level of effort from the Incumbent and so should use a higher cutoff rule with respect to public goods. Indeed, this was true in the symmetric model of Example 2.1. But this intuition is incomplete. Changes to effective accountability change the informativeness of governance outcomes. This change in informativeness has an independent effect on the Voter's reelection standard. We will see that the informativeness effect can have counterintuitive implications: higher levels of effective accountability can lead the Voter to use a lower benchmark for reelection.
To understand why this is the case, consider the impact of increasing effort, a, on the benchmark, g(a). There are two effects. The first is due to an increase in productivity, holding the level of informativeness fixed. Let ν(a) be the level of public goods that, in equilibrium, provides neutral news about the Incumbent-that is, that leaves the Voter's beliefs about the Incumbent unchanged.
Then ν(a) solves Pr I (θ|ν(a), a) = π I . When φ is symmetric, we can repeat the analysis in Example 2.1 to get
Observe that ν(a) is increasing in a.
The second effect is due to the change in informativeness. Take
as a measure of informational effectiveness. By Theorem 3.1, if a * * > a * , then the following equivalence holds: Effort and type are local complements (resp. local substitutes) at a * * , a * * if and only if ι(a * * ) ≥ ι(a * ) (resp. ι(a * ) ≥ ι(a * * )).
To understand, intuitively, how the informativeness effect works, start by observing that the Voter may receive good news (resp. bad news) about the Incumbent, relative to his prior, and nonetheless replace (resp. retain) her. This can occur if the ex ante probability that the Incumbent is a high type is lower (resp. higher) than the ex ante probability that the Challenger is a high type. With this in mind, observe that: (i) more informative experiments exacerbate good and bad news about the Incumbent, while (ii) less informative experiments temper good and bad news about the Incumbent. If the benchmark associated with a lower level of effort provides good news about the Incumbent (relative to the prior π I ), then a more informative experiment will require a lower benchmark for reelection. Likewise, if the benchmark associated with a higher level of effort provides bad news about the Incumbent (relative to the prior π I ), then a less informative experiment will require a lower benchmark for reelection.
This argument suggests two instances in which the Voter's benchmark will move in the intuitive direction. The two effects will move in the same direction if either (i) the Voter's benchmark provides bad news about the Incumbent and there are complements or (ii) the Voter's benchmark provides good news about the Incumbent and there are substitutes. The following result bears out this intuition:
(i) If π I ≥ π C and effort and type are complements at a * * , a * , thenĝ(a * * ) >ĝ(a * ).
(ii) If π C ≥ π I and effort and type are substitutes at a * * , a * , thenĝ(a * * ) >ĝ(a * ).
Below we present a graphical argument that allows us to separately analyze the two effects discussed above. Doing so has two benefits. First, it makes clear how the proof of Theorem 4.1 works. Second, it elucidates the two effects, which allow us to understand the cases not covered by the theorem. These cases allow for the possibility of a counterintuitive change in Voter behavior, which will be demonstrated in Examples 4.1 and 4.2 at the end of this section.
For each a ∈ A, we can express the likelihood ratio in terms of the variables (g, ν(a), ι(a)),
Fix a * * > a * where both a * and a * * are justifiable. Write LR * (·) = LR (·, a * ) and LR * * (·) = LR (·, a * * ). Figure 4 .1 draws the function LR * (·). Observe that, by the MLRP, it is increasing in g. The values ν(a * ) andĝ(a * ) solve LR * (ν(a * )) = 1 and LR * (ĝ(a * )) = β, where we write β for the benchmark 1−π I π I π C 1−π C . The valueĝ(a * * ) also solves LR * * (ĝ(a * * )) = β. Thus, to determine the relationship betweenĝ(a * ) andĝ(a * * ), we want to understand the relationship between the functions LR * (·) and LR * * (·).
To do so, it will be convenient to define an auxiliary functionL : R → R wherẽ
That is, this function is obtained from LR * by increasing the ν(a * ) variable to ν(a * * ), leaving the ι(a * ) variable fixed. This change can be viewed as a thought experiment where we change the level (i) For each g, LR * (g) >L(g).
(ii) IfL(g) = β, theng >ĝ(a * ). Now suppose we begin with the functionL and allow the level of informativeness to change, going from ι(a * ) to ι(a * * ). Figures 4.2a-4.2b depict the case of complements, which increases informativeness. In this case, outcomes that were good news about the Incumbent are now better news and outcomes that were bad news about the Incumbent are now worse news. Thus, if g > ν(a * * ) (resp. g < ν(a * * )) then LR * * (g) >L(g) (resp. LR * * (g) <L(g)). Figures 4.2c-4.2d depict the case of substitutes, which decreases informativeness. This tempers good news about the Incumbent and exacerbates bad news about the Incumbent. Thus, if g > ν(a * * ) (resp. g < ν(a * * )) then LR * * (g) <L(g) (resp. LR * * (g) >L(g)).
Lemma 4.2. Suppose φ is symmetric.
(i) Suppose effort and type are complements at a * , a * * . Then g > ν(a * * ) implies LR * * (g) >L(g), g < ν(a * * ) implies LR * * (g) <L(g), and LR * * (ν(a * * )) =L(ν(a * * )).
(ii) Suppose effort and type are substitutes at a * , a * * . Then g > ν(a * * ) implies LR * * (g) <L(g), g < ν(a * * ) implies LR * * (g) >L(g), and LR * * (ν(a * * )) =L(ν(a * * )).
Recall, the auxiliary functionL meets the benchmark β at some level of public goodsg >ĝ(a * ).
If, at the benchmark β, LR * * is to the right ofL, then we also have thatĝ(a * * ) ≥g >ĝ(a * ). Refer When effort and type are complements at a * , a * * , then LR * * is to the right ofL at the benchmark β provided the benchmark is less than 1. When effort and type are substitutes at a * , a * * , then LR * * is to the right ofL at the benchmark β provided the benchmark is above 1.
Using the fact that 1 ≥ β if and only if π I ≥ π C , this gives Theorem 4.1.
We have seen that, if the Voter's benchmark provides good news about the Incumbent and there are strict complements or the Voter's benchmark provides bad news about the Incumbent and there are strict substitutes, then the neutral news and informativeness effects pull the Voter's benchmark in opposite directions. It remains the be shown that the informativeness effect can be sufficiently strong to lead to the counterintuitive result: an increase in effective accountability can lead to a less stringent reelection rule. Example 4.1 shows this is possible in the case of complements and for each a ∈ A. This implies that g(1) ∈ (5.08, 5.09) andĝ(2) ∈ (4.79, 4.80).
With this, observe that the incremental returns in reelection probabilities satisfy IR (2, 1|2) ∈ (.023, .024) and IR (2, 1|1) ∈ (.014, .015).
Take ( With this, observe that the incremental returns in reelection probabilities satisfy IR (2, 1|2) ∈ (.001, .002) and IR (2, 1|1) ∈ (.003, .004).
Take ( 
Variation in Effective Accountability
Up until now, we have attempted to understand the effect of higher levels of effective accountability on the Voter's welfare and the Voter's reelection strategy.
In the examples we have seen, variation in effective accountability resulted from variation in the institutions of formal accountability (reflected as variations in (B, c)). 8 In this section, we will see that variation in effective accountability can arise even without variation in the institutions of formal accountability. Such variation can arise if, within a given model M(B, c), there are multiple equilibria that differ in their level of effective accountability-i.e., if, for a given model M(B, c) , the set E(B, c) has at least two levels of effort.
Section 2 pointed to why such multiplicity might arise: Distinct expectations about the Incumbent's first-period behavior are associated with distinct cut-off rules for the Voter. This generates distinct first-period incentives for the Incumbent. But, while suggestive that this may lead to a situation of multiplicity, the multiplicity is not inevitable, as Example D.1 in Appendix D illustrates.
In what follows, we fix a production function and beliefs (about type and noise). We ask: Does there exist a benefit of reelection and a cost function so that there are multiple equilibria that differ in their first-period effort levels? Theorem 5.1 provides a condition on the production technology and beliefs that is necessary and sufficient for an affirmative answer to this question. Proposition 5.1 points out that any production function is consistent with multiple equilibria that differ in their first-period effort levels.
To understand what this approach buys, note that, for a given production function and beliefs, all equilibria may involve the same first-period effort level. (Again, refer to Example D.2.) However, for the very same production function and beliefs but a slightly perturbed cost function, there may be multiple equilibria that differ in their first-period effort levels. See Example D.1 in in Appendix D.
Why is the approach we take of interest? We view both the Incumbent's benefit from reelection and the cost of effort as fundamentally subjective. The set of institutions will influence material benefits of reelection (e.g., salary, prestige, and so on) and material costs of higher effort (e.g., foregone rents, time not devoted to other policy areas, and so on). But the institutions cannot pin down the Politician's utility from these material outcomes. On the other hand, for a given set of institutions, the analyst may have intuitions or empirical knowledge about the nature of the production function or the beliefs. For instance, the analyst may think that it is quite likely that there are many high types in the pool of potential politicians and so it is quite likely that any given
Politician is a high type. Or, in a particular application, the analyst may think effort and type are complements/substitutes. Thus, it is of interest to understand conditions on production and beliefs that imply that there is a benefit of reelection and cost function so that, in the associated game, there are multiple equilibria that differ in terms of first-period effort.
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Multiplicity
Say the pair (a * , a * * ) is justifiable if there exists some pair (B, c) so that {a * , a * * } ⊆ E(B, c).
(Observe that a * and a * * can each be justifiable even if the pair (a * , a * * ) is not justifiable, i.e., we 
(Here we use the fact that −IR (a * , a * * |a * ) = IR (a * * , a * |a * ).) This trivial argument gives a necessary condition for the pair (a * , a * * ) to be justifiable, namely IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) ≥ IR (a * * , a * |a * ).
To interpret this necessary condition, take a * * > a * . If the Voter uses the cutoff ruleĝ(a * * ) (resp. g(a * )), then IR (a * * , a * * |a * * ) (resp. IR (a * * , a * * |a * )) is the incremental increase in the probability of reelection in moving from the lower to the higher effort. Equation (5) says that the incremental increase in the probability of reelection, in moving from the lower effort a * to the higher effort a * * is higher when the Voter uses the cutoff ruleĝ(a * * ) vs. when the Voter uses the cutoff ruleĝ(a * ).
We are interested in providing a sufficient condition for a pair of distinct effort levels (a * , a * * )
to be justifiable. Observe that, if Equation (5) is satisfied, then we can find a benefit of reelection and a cost function (B, c) satisfying Equation (4). If a * and a * * are the only possible effort levels, Equation (4) suffices to conclude that (B, c) justifies both a * and a * * . But, when there are three or more levels of effort, Equation (4) is no longer sufficient: For a given (B, c), Equation (4) may be satisfied even if (B, c) does not justify either of a * , a * * , or both. Specifically, Equation (4) says that, if there is an equilibrium where a * (resp. a * * ) is played, then the Incumbent does not have an incentive to deviate to a * * (resp. a * ). It is silent about deviating to some effort level a = a * , a * * .
(Example D.3 in Appendix D illustrates that there may very well be an incentive to deviate to some alternate effort level.)
In sum, if the local condition IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) ≥ IR (a * * , a * |a * ) is satisfied, it is trivial to construct a pair (B, c) so that Equation (4) is satisfied. However, Equation (4) is not sufficient for (B, c)
to justify either of a * or a * * . Nonetheless, a surprising fact is true: Whenever the local condition IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) ≥ IR (a * * , a * |a * ) is satisfied, we can construct some pair (B, c) that justifies both a * and a * * . That is, the local condition is sufficient for multiplicity even though equilibrium depends on global incentive compatibility.
Theorem 5.1. Fix a * * , a * ∈ A, so that a * * > a * . The following are equivalent:
(i) IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) ≥ IR (a * * , a * |a * ).
(ii) There exists a (B, c) that justifies both a * and a * * . Observe that the requirement of IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) ≥ IR (a * * , a * |a * ) is identified from the technological environment-i.e., the production technology and distributions of types and noise-alone. Thus, Parts (i)-(ii) provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the technological environment to be consistent with multiple equilibria that differ in their level of effective accountability: There are preferences of Politicians that justify (at least) two distinct effort levels if and only if there are effort levels a * * > a * so that IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) ≥ IR (a * * , a * |a * ). Part (iii) says that such preferences are non-degenerate. If there is some preference profile (B, c) that justifies both a * and a * * , then there are an uncountable set of distinct preferences that each justify both a * and a * * .
Focus on the equivalence between Parts (i) and (ii). One direction is trivial: It is immediate that Part (ii) implies Part (i). The converse is not obvious. When Part (i) holds, it is trivial to construct a pair (B, c) so that Equation (4) for all a ∈ A. Thus, there are |A| − 1 inequalities associated with any equilibrium level of effort-for multiplicity there are at least 2(|A| − 1). This can result in uncountably many inequalities. Part (i), instead, verifies a single inequality.
Understanding Multiplicity
Theorem 5.1 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for there to exist some pair (B, c) that justifies two levels of effort. But it is silent on the extent to which those conditions put restrictions on cost functions or production functions that are consistent with multiplicity. In this section, we address some natural questions that arise about such restrictions. We then use that discussion to relate Theorem 5.1 to the multiplicity result in Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) .
Convex Costs If (a * , a * * ) is justifiable, then there exists some pair (B, c) so that {a * , a * * } ∈ E(B, c). Notice, in the statement, there is no restriction on how we choose the cost function c. In particular, we do not require that c be convex. At a conceptual level, we see no reason to restrict attention to convex cost functions (in this application). Nonetheless, it is useful to note that the result does not require that we choose a non-convex cost function. Example D.2 in Appendix D illustrates this point: It gives an example of an environment where there are multiple equilibria that differ in their level of effective accountability. In that example, the production function is additive and the cost function is convex.
Production Technologies Theorem 5.1 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the environment to be consistent with multiple equilibria that differ in their level of effective accountability. The condition is a joint requirement on production and beliefs. Importantly, any production function can satisfy the condition (for some set of beliefs). In particular: Proposition 5.1 says that, for any production technology, any two effort levels a * , a * * , and any (symmetric) distribution of noise, we can find some distribution of types so that both a * and a * * Proposition 5.2. Suppose the model is symmetric, with π I = π C = π and fix a * * = a * . There exists aπ[a * , a * * ] ∈ (0, 1) so that the pair (a * , a * * ) is justifiable if and only if π ≥π[a * , a * * ].
Moreover:
(i) If effort and type are strict complements at a * , a * * , thenπ[a * , a * * ] < 1 2 .
(ii) If effort and type are both complements and substitutes at a * , a * * , , thenπ[a * , a * * ] = 1 2 .
(iii) If effort and type are strict substitutes at a * , a * * , , thenπ[a * , a * * ] > 1 2 .
Proposition 5.2 focuses on the case when the Incumbent and Challenger are drawn from the same pool of candidates. It says that the pair (a * , a * * ) is justifiable if the pool of candidates is sufficiently weighted toward high quality types. The phrase 'sufficiently weighted' is determined byπ[a * , a * * ], which in turn depends on whether effort and type are local substitutes or local complements.
The conclusions of Proposition 5.2 do not hinge on the Politicians being drawn from the same distribution. Proposition D.1 in Appendix 5 shows that if they are drawn from 'similar' distributions, the conclusions obtain. φ is the standard normal distribution.) The figures illustrate the set of (π I , π C ) so that the pair (a * , a * * ) = (1, 2) is justifiable. In the context of this example, the requirement that π C is close to π I does not appear particularly demanding.
Connection to Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) In the context of wage-based incentives, Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole, 1999 (henceforth DJT) also show a multiplicity result. That result imposes assumptions on the distribution of types and the production technology. In particular, they consider a parameterized production technology that exhibits strict complementarities between the agent's effort and ability. Theorem 5.1 says that, in our context, multiplicity (associated with different levels of effective accountability) requires a particular form of complementarity-that the incremental return to high effort must be larger when the Voter expects high effort. This type of complementarity is generated endogenously through Voter learning. In particular, Proposition 5.1 says that strict complementarities between the Incumbent's effort and ability are neither necessary nor sufficient for this type of complementarity: Effort and ability may be strict substitutes and still two effort levels can be justifiable.
At a conceptual level, there is an important difference between the nature of the our multiplicity results versus that in DJT. DJT fix a convex cost function as part of the description of the model.
Conditional upon observing an outcome, the analysis endogenously chooses a benefit; the benefit is constrained to equal the conditional expectation of the agent's type. Here, we also choose a benefit, but the nature of the choice is quite different: We choose a benefit as part of the description of the model and we do not constrain the benefit to equal the conditional expectation of the agent's type.
Each of these choices is fit for the question at hand: In DJT, the benefit is a wage and the choice of wage is a strategic variable. Thus, it makes sense that the wage is chosen after observing variables and is equal to the conditional expectation of the agent's type. Here, however, the benefit reflects a subjective utility from holding office. Thus, the benefit is prior to the model and there is no reason the benefit ought to equal the conditional expectation of the politician's type. Likewise, we do not impose a restriction that the chosen cost function must be convex; we allow for a more general class of preferences. (That said, we have seen that multiplicity can be consistent with convex cost functions.)
Welfare and Behavior Results
Above we showed that variation in effective accountability due to variation in institutions can have counterintuitive effects on both Voter welfare and Voter behavior. Here we show that these results extend to the case where the variation in effective accountability derives from equilibrium multiplicity.
Welfare and Multiplicity Example 3.1 illustrated that increasing effective accountability, by changing institutions of formal accountability, may decrease Voter welfare. We observe that the same effect can happen in a setting where the variation in effective accountability comes from equilibrium multiplicity. E(B, c) . And, as shown in Example 3.1, VW 1 (a * ) + VW 2 (a * ) > VW 1 (a * * ) + VW 2 (a * * ).
When is it the case that, within a given model M(B, c) , higher levels of effective accountability are associated with higher levels of Voter welfare? Corollary 3.1 says that, when effort and type are (local) complements, higher levels of effective accountability are associated with higher levels of Voter welfare. Propositions 3.1 and 5.2 speak to the case when effort and type are (local) substitutes-at least when π I = π C = π. Proposition 5.2 says that, in this case, the pair (a * , a * * )
is justifiable if and only if π meets some thresholdπ[a * , a * * ], whereπ[a * , a * * ] > 1 2 . Proposition 3.1 adds that, in this case, a * * leads to higher Voter welfare if either π is sufficiently large, i.e., greater than some π[a * , a * * ], or sufficiently small, i.e., less than some π[a * , a * * ]. Certainly then, if π is greater than max{π[a * , a * * ], π[a * , a * * ]}, we have that, within a given model, the equilibrium with a higher level of effective accountability will be the equilibrium with a higher level of Voter welfare.
However, we do not know if π[a * , a * * ] >π[a * , a * * ] and so do not know if the conclusion only holds when π I = π C is sufficiently high. 9
Reelection Rules and Multiplicity Examples 4.1-4.2 illustrated that increasing the level of effective accountability, by changing the institutions of formal accountability, may result in the Voter using a less stringent voting rule. In the case of complements, the same effect can arise in a setting where the variation in effective accountability comes from equilibrium multiplicity. Recall Example 4.2 showed that, in the case of substitutes, variation in effective accountability can lead the Voter to adopt a less stringent voting rule. In the case of substitutes, we do not know if the same conclusion holds when the variation in effective accountability is due to equilibrium multiplicity. (We have neither been able to construct an analogous example nor prove that such an example does not exist.) It, thus, remains an open question.
Normative Implications
The results in Section 5 highlight that there can be variation in effective accountability, even if there is no variation in institutions. Variation in players' expectations alone are sufficient to yield different levels of effective accountability. This fact has important normative implications, both for evaluating the performance of societies and institutions and for evaluating voter behavior.
Non-Monotone Welfare Effects of Institutional Reform
It is important to recall that all of our welfare results depend on whether effort and type are local complements or substitutes. As such, the implications of variation in effective accountability for voter welfare may differ depending on the magnitude of the initial level of effort and the change in the incumbent's effort. For instance, there may be settings where effort and type are local complements at (a * , a * * ) and local substitutes at (a * * , a * * * ). (Indeed, we saw such an example in Section 1.) Likewise, there may be settings in which effort and type are local complements at (a * , a * * ) and local substitutes at (a * , a * * * ).
This has important implications for thinking about the welfare impact of changes in institutions of formal accountability. Such changes may in principle have different effects depending on the extent to which they change B or c. For example, suppose a small increase in an incumbent's salary leads to small increase in effort, while a large increase leads to a large increase in effort. If effort and type are local complements in the former case and local substitutes in the latter case, voter welfare would be higher for the small change but might be lower with the large change.
This suggests the possibility that variation in an institutional parameter (e.g., B) could have nonmonotone effects on Voter welfare.
Evaluating Society and Institutions: Accountability Traps
Our multiplicity and welfare results give rise to a concept that we will call an accountability trap. The idea of accountability traps helps make sense of a number of empirical observations: Countries with similar democratic institutions display considerable variation in the quality of governance outcomes. Further, in many societies with relatively bad governance, voters do not harshly sanction poorly performing politicians. (See, e.g., Bardhan, 1997; Chang, Golden and Hill, 2010; Golden, 2010 .) These observations are consistent with the idea that different societies, while sharing the same set of institutions, can differ in their expectations about governance. Cynical voters can have low expectations for government performance and, consequently, politicians are cynical and do not bother to work hard on the voters' behalf. The result is poor governance outcomes that are not harshly sanctioned. Indeed, such outcomes are often associated with such cynicism. (See, e.g., the discussion in Bardhan, 1997.) The possibility of accountability traps has important implications for improving effective accountability and voter welfare. The literature has presumed that improving voter welfare requires improving the level of effective accountability and, in turn, that increasing the level of effective accountability requires changing institutions. There are two difficulties with this statement. First, a society may be in an accountability trap that involves a high level of effective accountability relative to the level that would maximize voter welfare. In that case, improving voter welfare may require lowering the level of effective accountability. Second, in the presence of an accountability trap, the first-order difficulty faced by the society may not be the current set of institutions. It may instead be societal expectations that leave it trapped in a situation with low voter welfare.
Hence, institutional reform may not be effective-even a reform that moves to an institution that, on average, has been associated with a higher level of voter welfare in structurally similar societies.
How then can voter welfare be improved? The answer depends on the underlying source of the accountability trap. In this paper, accountability traps arise because the politician's early behavior influences the voter's ability to infer information about the politician's characteristics. To escape such an accountability trap, a society must shift expectations. And, indeed, improvements in effective accountability do appear consistent with such shifts. As Golden (2010) notes, improvements in accountability often happen suddenly, "as part of a wave of public revulsion."
Evaluating Voter Behavior
The primary goal of electoral accountability is to ensure that politicians have incentives to exert effort that benefit voters (Key, 1966; Pitkin, 1967; Fiorina, 1981; Bartels, 2004, 2006; Healy, Malhotra and Mo, 2010) . Voters are meant to achieve this goal within a given institutional setting. This raises the question: How well are voters doing with respect to the goal of creating incentives for politicians to take costly effort on their behalf ? The question is of interest in political philosophy (Pitkin, 1967; Manin, Przeworski and Stokes, 1999; Mansbridge, 2003 Mansbridge, , 2009 ) and empirical political economy (Fiorina, 1981; Bartels, 2004, 2006; Healy, Malhotra and Mo, 2010) . A formal literature has developed to address this question.
The early formal literature addressed this by focusing on "pure moral hazard" models (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Austen-Smith and Banks, 1989) . In those models, there is no candidate heterogeneity, so voters are indifferent between incumbents and challengers. As such, any reelection rule is a best response for the voter. Given this, evaluating voter behavior involves asking how close voters come to using the rule that provides the politician with the most powerful incentives.
A critique of this literature, due to Fearon (1999) , argues that this is the wrong benchmark.
Choosing the reelection rule that provides the most powerful incentives is generally not credible:
If the voter believes there is any difference in an incumbent's and challenger's expected future performance (i.e., if there is any payoff-relevant candidate heterogeneity), then sequential rationality requires him to elect the politician who is expected to perform better. Put differently, Fearon points out that the benchmark by which the voter is evaluated must incorporate the voter's desire to select good types. 11 A subsequent literature has taken Fearon's argument to suggest that, when politicians are heterogenous, the desire to select good types uniquely pins down voter behavior. The conclusion is that the (historically important) question of evaluating voter behavior is trivial.
Our multiplicity results show that this conclusion is unwarranted. When candidates are heterogeneous, there is a more subtle way to evaluate voter performance: Are voters using the reelection rule that creates the strongest possible incentives relative to the set of all reelection rules consistent with an equilibrium? Theorem 5.1 and Propositions 5.1-5.2 say that this set may be non-trivial and so there remains scope for evaluating voter performance.
That said, our results are suggestive that the standard evaluative procedure may be problematic.
The literature presumes that increasing effective accountability is necessarily desirable from the perspective of voter welfare. But, as we showed in Examples 3.1 and 5.1, this need not be the case:
When effort and type are strict substitutes, a higher level of effective accountability reduces the quality of electoral selection. This creates the possibility that the overall quality of governance (as measured in voter welfare) is higher with a lower level of effective accountability. If so, increasing effective accountability may not be a desirable goal. As such, our analysis suggests a rethinking of the evaluative criteria that underlies the existing literature-away from the level of effective accountability and towards a more comprehensive measure of voter welfare.
Theorems 3.1 and 4.1 also point to subtleties in how observed voter behavior may be mapped into evaluative measures. For instance, suppose we observe a voter adopting a more lenient benchmark by which to hold politicians accountable. The natural conclusion is that this reflects a decline in voter performance. However, our results show that this need not be the case. When π C > π I , it may well be welfare improving for the voter to adopt a more lenient benchmark. In the case of substitutes, this is because the more lenient benchmark corresponds to a lower level of effective accountability which, in turn, can improve voter welfare. In the case of complements, this is because the more lenient benchmark can correspond to a higher level of effective accountability which, in turn, improves voter welfare.
Appendix A Proof for Sections 3
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
For each θ ∈ Θ, write Φ * * ,θ (resp. Φ * ,θ ) for the CDF defined by Φ * * ,θ (g) = Φ(g − f (a * * , θ)) (resp. Φ * ,θ (g) = Φ(g − f (a * , θ))). Since Φ * * ,θ is strictly increasing on R, for each x ∈ (0, 1), Φ −1 * * ,θ (x) is well-defined. Observe that a * * is more effective than a * if and only if, for each g ∈ R, (Φ * * ,θ ) −1 (Φ * ,θ (g)) is nondecreasing in θ. With this, it suffices to show the following: For each g, (Φ * * ,θ ) −1 (Φ * ,θ (g)) = f (a * * , θ) − f (a * , θ) + g.
Start by noting that, for each x ∈ (0, 1),
To see this, fix y = Φ −1 * * ,θ (x) and observe that Φ * * ,θ (y) = Φ * * ,θ (Φ −1 * * ,θ (x)) = x. So, x = Φ(y − f (a * * , θ)). Since Φ is injective, Φ −1 (x) = y − f (a * * , θ). Alternatively, Φ −1 * * ,θ (x) = y = Φ −1 (x) + f (a * * , θ). This establishes Equation (6).
Next observe that (Φ * * ,θ ) −1 (Φ * ,θ (g)) = f (a * * , θ) + Φ −1 (Φ * ,θ (g)) = f (a * * , θ)
where the first equality is by Equation (6), the second is by definition of Φ * ,θ , and the last equality uses the fact that Φ is injective. This establishes the desired result.
Results for Symmetric Model
Fix some symmetric model M(B, c) where π I = π C = π. Consider an equilibrium associated with the first-period effort level a * . Write Pr(θ P 2 = θ|a * ) for the probability that the Politician in office in the second period is type θ. Note, the event "the Politician in office in the second period is type θ" can be realized in one of three ways: (i) the first-period Incumbent is type θ and is reelected, (ii) the first-period Incumbent and the Challenger are both type θ and the first-period Incumbent is not reelected, or (iii) the first-period Incumbent is type θ, she is not reelected, and the Challenger is type θ. Thus, Pr(θ P 2 = θ|a * ) = π Pr(f (a * , θ) + 1 ≥ĝ(a * )) + π 2 Pr(f (a * , θ) + 1 ≤ĝ(a * )) + (1 − π)π Pr(f (a * , θ) + 1 ≤ĝ(a * )).
(This implicitly use the fact that the random variable generating 1 is atomless, i.e., so that Pr(f (a * , θ)+ 1 =ĝ(a * )) = 0.) Using the fact that Pr(f (a * , θ)+ 1 ≥ĝ(a * )) = 1−Φ(ĝ(a * )−f (a * , θ)),
The next lemma is an immediate consequence of this calculation.
Fix some a ∈ A. It will be convenient to introduce a function VW 1 [a] : [0, 1] → R and In what follows, we will fix a production function f and effort levels a * * > a * . It will be convenient to adopt the notation (for the output of production) described in Figure Proof. Note that f (a * * , θ) − f (a * , θ) = ψ * * + ρ * * − ρ * , from which the claim follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. It will be convenient to adopt the notation for the production function described in Figure A 
Thus, if effort and type are strict substitutes (respectively, strict complements) at a * , a * * , the difference function is strictly decreasing (respectively, strictly increasing) on (0, p min ) = ∅ (respectively, (0, p max ) = ∅) and strictly increasing (respectively, strictly decreasing) on (p min , 1) = ∅ (respectively, (p max , 1) = ∅). And, if effort and type are neither strict substitutes nor strict complements at a * , a * * , this is a constant function. It follows that there exists π[a * , a * * ], π[a * , a * * ] ∈ (0, 1) so that p ∈ (0, π[a * , a * * ]) ∪ (π[a * , a * * ], 1) if and only if ∆[a * * , a * ](p) ≥ 0.
Appendix B Proofs for Section 4
Prior to presenting the results in this appendix, we will establish a useful equivalence: Fix a realvalued random variable that is distributed according to some distribution full support differentiable
Say ψ satisfies the strict MLRP if, for each x > x , L(·, x, x ) is strictly increasing. Observe that, if ψ satisfies the strict MLRP and each L(·, x, x ) has non-zero derivatives, then the derivative of each L(·, x, x ) with respect to y is strictly positive (at each point).
Lemma B.1.
(i) If ψ satisfies the strict MLRP and each likelihood ratio L(·, x, x ) has non-zero derivatives, then log •ψ is strictly concave.
(ii) If log •ψ is strictly concave, then ψ satisfies the strict MLRP and each likelihood ratio L(·, x, x )
has non-zero derivatives.
Remark B.1. For eachỹ and x > x ∂L(·, x, x ) ∂y Proof of Lemma 4.1. Observe that, for each g, there exists some g > g so that g = g + (ν(a * * ) − ν(a * )). SinceL (g) = φ(g − ν(a * ) − ι(a * )) φ(g − ν(a * ) + ι(a * )) = LR * (g ) and LR * (g) > LR * (g ), it follows that LR * (g) >L(g). SinceL is strictly increasing,L(g) = β
implies thatg >ĝ(a * ).
Proof of Lemma B.2. First, define Q(x, δ) = x − δ and Q(x + δ). Note that log L(x, δ) = log φ(Q(x, δ)) − log φ (Q(x, δ) ).
Now, differentiate with respect to δ to get:
Since φ is symmetric, φ (y) = −φ (−y). So, for all δ, ∂ ∂δ log L(0, δ) = 0. With this, the claim will follow if ∂ ∂δ log L(x, δ) is increasing in x. Differentiating log L(x, δ),
By Lemma B.1, φ is strictly log concave. From this, the last equivalence is strictly positive.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Immediate from Lemma B.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By Lemma 4.1, it suffices to show thatĝ(a * * ) ≥g. To show this, it suffices to show that LR * * (g) ≤L(g) = β. If so, then using the MLRP and the fact that LR * * (ĝ(a * * )) = β, it follows thatĝ(a * * ) ≥g.
Observe that, by symmetry of the PDF, L(ν(a * * )) = φ(−ι(a * )) φ(ι(a * )) = 1 = φ(−ι(a * * )) φ(ι(a * * )) = LR * * (ν(a * * )).
So, if π I ≥ p C (resp. π C ≥ p I ) and effort and type are complements (resp. substitutes) at a * * , a * , Lemma 4.2 gives that LR * * (g) ≤L(g) = β, as desired.
Appendix C Formal Accountability
Are there systematic changes in the institutions of formal accountability that serve to increase = {0, 1, 2} . The production function f is described by the following table.
θ θ 2 6.5 11 1 .5 4.9 0 0 4 Take Φ to be the CDF of the standard Normal distribution and let π I = π C = .5.
Using Example 2.1, the incremental returns satisfy the following bounds: Notice, since this example has strict substitutes, it is unambiguous that Voter welfare is lower in an equilibrium with lower effective accountability. Thus, in this example, increasing the rewards to office can lead to reduction in Voter welfare even though the Voter does not have to pay for that increased reward.
The production function f is described by the following table.
θ θ 2 8 9 1 5 7 0 0 4 
Appendix D Examples and Proofs for Section 5
We begin with the examples mentioned in the main text. We next point out that, by perturbing the cost of effort, we have multiple equilibria that differ in their levels of effective accountability. So Equation (4) is satisfied for effort levels a * = 0 and a * * = 2. We might then conclude that
A strategy of the Incumbent can be written as s I = (a, s I,2 ), where a is a first-period level of effort and s I,2 , a second-period plan, maps each first-period level of public goods plus a decision to reelect the Incumbent to a second period level of effort. Since the Incumbent's second-period information set can only be reached by a decision to reelect, we suppress reference to the decision and simply write s I,2 (g). A strategy of the Voter s V maps each level of public goods provided (in the first period) to a reelection decision. Thus, s V (g) = 1 (s V (g) = 0) represents the fact that the Voter reelects (replaces) the Incumbent if g is the level of first-period public goods. A strategy for the Challenger s C maps each level of first-period public goods provided and a decision to replace the Incumbent to a second period level of effort. Since the Challenger's second-period information set can only be reached by a decision to replace, we suppress reference to the decision and simply write s C (g). We begin with a Lemma that will be of use:
Lemma D.2. Fix some a * and some a > a .
(i) Pr(a|a * ) > Pr(a |a * ) (ii) IR (a, a |a * ) > 0.
(iii) IR (a * , a |a * ) > IR (a * , a|a * ).
Proof. Part (i) follows from the fact that f is increasing in a. Part (ii) follows from Part (i). Part (iii) follows from Part (i), since IR (a * , a |a * ) = Pr(a * |a * ) − Pr(a |a * ) > Pr(a * |a * ) − Pr(a|a * ) = IR (a * , a|a * ).
Before coming to the proof of Theorem 5.1 we provide a sketch of the argument. Consider the case where a * = a. The idea will be to fix a benefit of reelection, viz. B, and constants n * and n * * . The constants will turn out to be the costs associated with the high and the lowest effort levels-i.e., when we later choose a cost function c that justifies both a * and a * * , it will satisfy c(a * ) = n * and c(a * * ) = n * * . As such, we fix B > n * > 0 and (in light of the necessity condition given by Equation (4)), we fix n * * > n * so that IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) ≥ n * * − n * B − n * ≥ IR (a * * , a * |a * ).
Suppose, in fact, that c is a cost function with c(a * ) = n * and c(a * * ) = n * * . Notice that, if (B, c) justifies a * , it must be that c(·) lies above the function N (·, a * ) : A → R where N (a, a * ) = IR (a, a * |a * )(B − n * ) + n * .
If this condition were not satisfied, the Incumbent would have an incentive to deviate from a * to an alternate effort level. Analogously, if (B, c) justifies a * * , it must be that c(·) lies above the function N (·, a * * ) : A → R with N (a, a * * ) = IR (a, a * * |a * * )(B − n * ) + n * * . Figure D .1 illustrates the functions N (·, a * ) and N (·, a * * ). They are each strictly increasing.
Moreover, by Equation (7), N (a * , a * ) = n * ≥ N (a * , a * * ) and N (a * * , a * * ) = n * * ≥ N (a * * , a * ). Thus, taking c to be the upper envelope of the functions, (B, c) justifies both a * and a * * .
Proof of Theorem 5.1: Part (i) if and only if Part (ii). The fact that part (ii) implies part (i) follows immediately from Lemma D.1. We show that part (i) implies part (ii). Suppose that IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) ≥ IR (a * * , a * |a * ) and we will show that we can construct (B, c) that justifies both a * * and a * .
To do so, it will be useful to fix certain constants: First choose B and n so that B > n > 0. If a * = a, fix n * = n. If a * = a, fix n * so that:
i * n * > n; iii * n + [IR (a * * , a|a * * ) − IR (a * * , a * |a * )](B − n) > n * .
The fact that requirements i * -ii * can be satisfied simultaneously follows from Lemma D.2(ii).
The fact that requirements i * -iii * can be satisfied simultaneously follows from IR (a * * , a|a * * ) > IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) (Lemma D.2(iii)) and IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) ≥ IR (a * * , a * |a * ) (by assumption), so that IR (a * * , a|a * * ) > IR (a * * , a * |a * ). Now fix n * * i * * n * * ≥ n * + IR (a * * , a * |a * )(B − n);
ii * * n * + IR (a * * , a * |a * * )(B − n) ≥ n * * ; and
iii * * n + IR (a * * , a|a * * )(B − n) ≥ n * * with strict inequality if a * = a.
The fact that requirements i * * -ii * * can be satisfied simultaneously follows from the assumption that IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) ≥ IR (a * * , a * |a * ). Condition iii * * follows from condition ii * * , if a * = a. The fact that requirements i * * -iii * * can be satisfied simultaneously when a * > a follows from condition iii * above. Note, it follows from Lemma D.2 and i * * that n * * > n * .
Construct a function N : A × {a * , a * * } → R so that N (a, a * ) = IR (a, a * |a * )(B − n) + n * and N (a, a * * ) = IR (a, a * * |a * * )(B − n) + n * * . It follows from Lemma D.2 that N (·, a * ) and N (·, a * * ) are strictly increasing in a. Moreover,
• n ≥ max{N (a, a * ), N (a, a * * )};
• n * = N (a * , a * ) ≥ N (a * , a * * );
• n * * = N (a * * , a * * ) ≥ N (a * * , a * ).
Let α = c(a * * )−c(a * ) B−c (a) and observe that IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) ≥ α ≥ IR (a * * , a * |a * ) > 0.
For a given ε > 0, define
• c (a * * ) = c(a * * ) + ε(α + 1),
• c (a * ) = c(a * ) + ε, and
• c (a) = c(a) + ε.
(Observe that c (a * * ) > c (a * ).) We will show that we can construct some pair (B,ĉ) so that B = B ,ĉ(a * * ) = c (a * * ),ĉ(a * ) = c (a * ),ĉ(a) = c (a), and (B,ĉ) justifies (a * , a * * ). Since (B,ĉ) represents different preferences than (B, c) and ε > 0 is chosen arbitrarily, this establishes the desired result.
First observe we have the following properties:
i * if a * = a, c (a * ) > c (a);
ii * if a * = a, c (a) + IR (a * , a|a * )(B − c (a)) > c (a * );
iii * if a * = a, c (a) + [IR (a * * , a|a * * ) − IR (a * * , a * |a * )](B − c (a)) > c (a * );
Property i * is immediate. Property ii * follows from ii * . Property iii * follows from iii * . Next observe that i * * c (a * * ) ≥ c (a * ) + IR (a * * , a * |a * )(B − c (a));
ii * * c (a * ) + IR (a * * , a * |a * * )(B − c (a)) ≥ c (a * * ); and
iii * * c (a) + IR (a * * , a|a * * )(B − c (a)) ≥ c (a * * ) with strict inequality if a * = a.
Property i * * follows from i * * and the fact that α ≥ IR (a * * , a * |a * ). Property ii * * follows from ii * * and the fact that IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) ≥ α. Part iii * * follows from iii * * and the fact that IR (a * * , a|a * * ) ≥ IR (a * * , a * |a * * ) ≥ α.
We next turn to Propositions 5.1-5.2. Define numbers Lemma D.3. If π I = π C = π, then the following are equivalent:
In what follows, we provide conditions on the production technology which imply that πX ≥
(1 − π) Y when π = π I = π C is sufficiently high. To do so, it will be useful to have two properties of Φ.
Lemma D.4. Let φ be symmetric. In what follows, we will fix a production function f and effort levels a * * > a * . It will be convenient to adopt the notation (for the output of production) described in Figure A. 1.
Lemma D.5. If φ is symmetric, then X > 0.
Proof. Applying Lemma D.4(i), X can be written as
Write d = ρ * * + ψ * * − ρ * and note that, by Lemma A.1, d > 0. We can then rewrite X as
Thus, by Lemma D.4(ii), X > 0 provided (i) ρ * −ψ * * − 1 2 ρ * * > − 1 2 ρ * −d and (ii) 1 2 ρ * > ρ * −ψ * * − 1 2 ρ * * . Condition (i) is immediate and Condition (ii) is by Lemma A.1.
Proposition D.1. Suppose φ is symmetric. Fix efforts a * * = a * and let π ∈ (π[a * , a * * ], 1). There exists some open neighborhood of (π, π) ∈ [0, 1] 2 , viz. N (π, π), so that, if (π I , π C ) ∈ N (π, π), then (a * , a * * ) is justifiable.
Proof. Observe thatĝ is a function, not only of a, but of π I and π C . It will be convenient to writê g : A × [0, 1] × [0, 1] → R, so that, for each (a, π I , π C ),ĝ(a, π I , π C ) LR (ĝ(a, π I , π C ), a) = π C 1 − π C 1 − π I π I .
Thus, for each a, a ∈ A, IR (a, a |·) : A × [0, 1] × [0, 1] → R is also a function of (a, π I , π C ).
It suffices to show that, for each (a, a ) and each (a * , ·, ·), IR (a, a |a * , ·, ·) : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → R is continuous in (π I , π C ). If so, by Proposition 5.2, for each (π,π) ∈ (p[a * , a * * ], 1) 2 , IR (a * * , a * |a * * ,π,π) − IR (a * * , a * |a * ,π,π) > 0.
By continuity, for each (π,π) ∈ (p[a * , a * * ], 1) 2 , there is some open neighborhood N of (π,π) so that, for all (π I , π C ) ∈ N IR (a * * , a * |a * * , π I , π C ) − IR (a * * , a * |a * , π I , π C ) > 0.
By Theorem 5.1, the claim follows.
To show that IR (a, a |a * , ·, ·) it continuous in (π I , π C ), it suffices to show that, for each a, g(a, ·, ·) is continuous in (π I , π C ). If so, then by continuity of Φ, IR (a, a |a * , ·, ·) it continuous in (π I , π C ).
WriteLR : R × A × [0, 1] × [0, 1] → R so that LR (g, a, π I , π C ) = φ(g − f (a, θ)) φ(g − f (a, θ)) − 1 − π I π I π C 1 − π C .
Observe that, for each a,LR (·, a, ·, ·) : R × [0, 1] × [0, 1] → R is differentiable in g and continuous in (g, π I , π C ). (This follows from the fact that φ is continuously differentiable.) Moreover,LR (·, a) is differentiable with a non-zero derivatives (since LR is). Thus, it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that eachĝ(a, ·, ·) is continuous in (π I , π C ).
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Immediate from Proposition D.1.
